REVIVING INFORMED CONSENT: USING RISK PERCEPTION IN
CLINICAL TRIALS
The current doctrine of informed consent falls far short of its potential to
serve as a valuable safeguard for human research subjects. Instead of
providing a channel of communication between physician and subject,
informed consent is a lifeless entity responsible for a large portion of the
misunderstanding existing between these parties. Acknowledging risk
perception principles may help transform the informed consent process
into an effective communication of health risks.

Introduction
Informed consent has become overlooked and underestimated in its role of protecting
human research subjects. Some critics have simply given up on informed consent: “informed
consent has negligible influence on whether a person enlists in a trial.”1 Others lament the failure
of informed consent by making broad generalizations that offer little constructive criticism,
alleging that physicians should do “a better job of warning patients about complications . . . .”2
“Informed consent must go beyond getting a person’s signature on a form.”3 But how? There
seems to be a unanimous consensus among physicians, the public, and the media that we need to
breathe new life into the currently inanimate informed consent document. Principles of risk
perception lend constructive advice for transforming the informed consent process.

The Clinical Trial Process
To market a new drug, the FDA requires the manufacturer to test the new drug in three
phases of clinical trials. During the clinical trials, the new drug is tested on human research
volunteers to ensure the drug’s safety and efficacy.4 In phase I, 20-100 healthy volunteers
(sometimes patients)5 receive the new drug to measure drug safety.6 Phase I tests only safety;
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researchers at this stage do not gather information about efficacy.7 Next, during phase II the drug
is administered to a group of several hundred patients8 with the “target” disease.9 Phase II tests
for efficacy as well as safety.10 Finally, in phase III, the drug is tested on “hundreds and even
thousands of patients.”11 This last phase provides information necessary to confirm the risks and
benefits associated with the new drug.12 After completing phase III trials, the manufacturer may
submit the research results to the FDA for approval in the form of a New Drug Application
(NDA). About 1 in 10 new drugs successfully pass through the rigorous three-phase process of
clinical trials.13
In short, drug manufacturers use clinical trials to gather data about whether a drug is safe
and effective for human use. Although animal testing and other laboratory studies are useful in
ensuring the safety of new drugs, there are some effects that cannot be discovered by any means
other than experimental human use. Therefore, clinical trials are necessary to protect the general
public. But what safeguards protect the individuals who participate in clinical trials?

Legal Protections for Human Research Subjects
The safety of human research subjects emerged as an issue of international importance
after the heinous war crimes of the Nazi doctors came to light. In response to egregious misuse
of human experimentation, the Nuremberg court established the Nuremberg Code which set
standards for medical experimentation on humans. The first rule of the Nuremberg Code states:
“The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”14 As evidence from its
prominent placement, consent is the backbone of ethical medical research. Building upon the
Nuremburg Code, the World Medical Association wrote the Declaration of Helsinki, which
maintains the voluntary consent requirement, adding further that participation must not only be a
voluntary choice, but also an informed one.15 In the United States, the requirement of informed
consent for human research subjects participating in clinical trials is codified at 21 C.F.R. § 50.02
(2003).
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In addition to informed consent, oversight provisions on the state and federal level protect
human research subjects.16 Researchers are also required to report any adverse effects occurring
during the course of clinical trials to the FDA and NIH.17

Reviving Informed Consent
Patients and physicians alike have lost faith in informed consent. Patients feel that
informed consent does not adequately disclose the potential risks. Patients feel uncomfortable
deciding whether to participate based on an oversimplified, watered down version of the true
risks of the study. However, most patients do not have the medical expertise to understand the
risks as described by a physician or by the FDA. Volunteers come from diverse backgrounds, so
the same informed consent process may appear too simple to one individual and too complex to
another.18

On the other side, physicians also express frustration with the current informed

consent process. Physicians often view informed consent as a legal technicality obstructing
progress, and may consequently introduce informed consent by announcing “We have to consent
you now.”19 The message is a command: “We have to get your signature now.”

A possible

solution is to transform the command into a communication between doctor and patient.
An effective communication must recognize the objectives of both parties. First, the
primary goal of the informed consent process is to protect human subjects. Second, the informed
consent process must ensure that people will continue to volunteer for the clinical trials so that
society can continue to benefit from new drugs.
Constructive criticism of informed consent must also recognize and address the failure of
current communication skills in general. The information researchers are trying to convey is
mysteriously scrambled somewhere between the speaker’s mouth and the volunteer’s ear, like a
very short version of the childhood game of telephone. To close this communication gap,
physicians conducting the informed consent process must take responsibility and initiative.
Baruch Fischoff, an expert in risk communication, offers a guiding principle to address this
dilemma:“If we have not gotten the message across, then we ought to assume that the fault is not
with our receivers.”20
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In sum, reviving informed consent requires improving communication skills and
addressing the objectives of both patient and physician.

Viewing Informed Consent as a Health Risk Communication
Informed consent is not the only context for practicing risk communication. Principles of
risk communication, and health risk communication in particular, have been explored in a variety
of contexts. For example, the threat of groundwater pollution requires industry representatives to
engage in health risk communication with the local community. The United States government
may face the task of using health risk communication to inform the American public about the
threat of biological warfare.21

Likewise, the informed consent process for clinical trials

represents a situation that deserves a tailored health risk communication plan.

The Inadequacy of Factual Data
Despite the extensive laboratory testing of a new drug, the fact remains that a clinical trial
is an experiment. The information most useful to a potential volunteer—what will happen?—is
unknown. Even the known “facts,” such as toxicology reports and statistics from animal testing,
are merely interpretations of data. A statistician can easily manipulate such data to imply the
desired results. Those with experience in financial accounting may testify to the manipulability
of numerical data. The following example demonstrates how scientific data, while completely
true and accurate, can be communicated in a way to mislead the public:
Take the example of a story made famous a couple of years ago, when a
junior high school student named Nathan Zohner surveyed a group of
classmates for a school science project. Zohner told them about a
chemical called dihydrogen monoxide. It is colorless, odorless, tasteless,
and causes thousands of deaths every year. Prolonged exposure to its
solid form causes severe tissue damage, exposure to its gaseous form
causes severe burns, and it has been found in excised tumors of terminal
cancer patients. Of 50 people Nathan surveyed, 43 said that dihydrogen
monoxide should be banned, 6 weren’t sure what to do, and only one
person correctly identified dihydrogen monoxide as plain old water, or
H2O.22
Regardless of additional regulations of clinical practice to monitor the accuracy of
statistical data, the final numbers do not determine the success or failure of a health risk
communication. Furthermore, the potential volunteer, an inexperienced layperson, will probably
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not find raw scientific data useful in making a decision about whether to participate in a clinical
trial.

The Inadequacy of the Printed Word
When designing informed consent documents, researchers and physicians debate at
length the words that will effectively communicate the risks of enrolling in a particular clinical
trial. A national committee recommends “documents be written at an eighth-grade or lower
reading level.”23 But others disagree: “If you have to put everything in eighth-grade terminology,
that leaves out a lot, and that’s wrong.”24 In this way, drafters of informed consent documents
face a double-edged sword. If the document is simple, it lacks the specificity to adequately
describe the particular risks. If the document describes the detailed risk, the document would
undoubtedly be too long and too complex to be understood by a layperson. Efficiency demands
the standardization of informed consent documents. However, to effectively communicate health
risks, we must resist standardization and consider the subjective, individual needs of the
volunteer. The informed consent document should serve merely as a starting point for the
communication.

Risk Perception as a Feasible Framework
Fishoff suggests that effective health risk communication should begin by identifying
“where the public is coming from.”25 As a first step to health risk communication, defining
“where the public is coming from” recognizes that risk, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.
Too often, physicians and researchers mistakenly believe that if the data for a particular
trial is good (that is, if the benefits outweigh the risks), then the rational reaction is to accept the
risk. In other words, the practitioner assumes that the subject perceives risk and reacts to risk in a
rational way. However, risk perception is not simply a balance between risks and benefits. Risk
reaction is often an emotional process, not a rational one. The irrational process of risk reaction
is demonstrated by public reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent
anthrax threat:
Many of us were afraid, and rightly so. But some people responded by
driving to a distant destination rather than flying, even though the facts
clearly showed that flying remained the far safer mode of transportation,
even after September 11. Some people bought guns, raising their risks
from firearms accidents far more than reducing their risk of being
23
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attacked by a terrorist. Many people took broad-spectrum antibiotics
even though they had no evidence that they had been exposed to
anthrax—but they didn’t get an annual flu shot.”26
Whether the decision to rely on emotional factors is conscious or unconscious, the fact
remains that most individuals respond to risk in a way that reflects their feelings about risk, not
their knowledge about risk. Risk perception is an emotionally-based, individual response to a
situation.
To revive informed consent, we must acknowledge the emotional nature of risk reaction.
Potential volunteers are likely to follow the general rule of emotional risk reaction behavior. In
contrast, the physician might not view the risk from such a subjective perspective. The physician
is acting in a professional capacity, and professionalism often demands objective judgment, free
from emotional bias. Similarly, the FDA will not approve a new drug based on feelings that the
drug is safe and effective. This rational viewpoint conflicts with the emotional viewpoint of the
potential volunteer. In order to effectively communicate the risks involved in a given clinical
trial, the physician must acknowledge this contrast in perspectives. The physician must ask not
“What do I need to know to decide about the safety of this drug?” but rather “What does this
potential volunteer need to know?” To better understand the volunteer’s perspective, we refer to
accepted principles of risk perception and apply them to the informed consent scenario.

Using Risk Perception in the Informed Consent Process
The previous section focused on the subjective nature of risk perception. However,
despite a broad spectrum of potential emotional reactions to perceived risk, “humans tend to fear
similar things, for similar reasons.”27 Ropeik and Gray describe a series of guiding principles that
predict how people perceive risk. Application of some of these principles to the clinical trial
setting may provide a better understanding of how risks should be communicated in the informed
consent process. Perhaps surprisingly, these risk perception principles often work in favor of
effective risk communication. In other words, according to this guide, the clinical trial setting is
actually conducive to effective risk communication. The following discussion describes several
risk perception concepts and how they affect the informed consent process in clinical trials. One
has already been demonstrated:
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•

“You will generally be more afraid of a risk that could directly affect you
than a risk that threatens others.”28

This risk perception concept describes why the physician and the volunteer react differently to
clinical trial risks. The volunteer perceives a direct risk, while the physician perceives only an
indirect risk. Additional elements of perception may lend increased clarity to the informed
consent process.

Emphasize the Voluntary Choice of Participation
•

“Most people are less afraid of a risk they choose to take than of a risk
imposed on them.”29

Ropeik and Gray elaborate on this choice concept by providing an illustrative example:
“Smokers are less afraid of smoking than they are of asbestos and other indoor air pollution in
their workplace, which is something over which they have little choice.”30 Thus, the health risk,
long-term lung disease, is less troubling when the individual voluntarily accepts that risk. The
support for this principle may be a bit circular. Is the connection between choice and risk
perception one of causation or mere correlation?

In other words, does choice affect risk

perception before or after the choice has been made? Before picking up a cigarette, a person
might ignorantly believe that lung disease is not dangerous. Based on this ignorant belief, the
person decides to smoke. Here, the decision to engage in risky behavior is based on incorrect
information, not the freedom to choose. In contrast, the lifelong smoker may also believe that
lung disease is not dangerous. Many habitual smokers claim to be aware of, but indifferent to
evidence that smoking is dangerous. In this case, the voluntary nature of the act causes the
perception that smoking is low risk behavior. The issue is whether one chooses to take risks
because he or she believes the risk is low or whether he or she believes the risk is low because of
a choice to engage in the risk.
Clarifying the relationship between choice and risk perception is necessary in order to
apply the principle to the informed consent process. By necessity, the informed consent process
must take place before the subject participates in the risky behavior. Thus, the choice concept
will have a greater impact on the informed process if the relationship between choice and risk
perception is causative rather than correlative. By emphasizing the voluntary nature of clinical
trials, participants will feel a greater freedom of choice, and thus will perceive a lower risk. If the
28
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freedom of choice causes the individual to perceive the risk as low, then emphasizing voluntary
participation is even more important.
If voluntary choice is both requisite and beneficial, why do physicians often downplay
the voluntary nature of clinical trials? Researchers may fear empowering participants due to their
urgent need for volunteer subjects. The enormous industry demand for new drugs translates into
an enormous demand for clinical trial participants.31 Adding to the weight of demand, physicians
and researchers also feel pressured by time. Because of the restraints of patent term expiration,
the manufacturer must push a new drug through the FDA approval process as quickly as
possible.32 Although the FDA and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have worked together
to promulgate regulations that help accommodate the unique requirements of the drug industry,33
manufacturers must still race to get products to market. In short, researchers urgently need
clinical trial volunteers.
In order to recruit clinical trial volunteers, the informed consent process must
communicate a tolerable level of risk to the subject. The goal of recruiting volunteers could be
achieved by omitting or misrepresenting the risks so that the subject views participation as a
negligible risk. This approach blatantly violates the rules governing ethical medical research and
is therefore an unacceptable means of conducting the necessary risk communication.34

As

opposed to simply lying, the researcher might be tempted to present the clinical trial as the only
viable choice for the subject. The legality of such implied coercion is highly questionable. If
alternative treatment is available, the physician must present each option and its probable
consequences to the potential volunteer.35 Disclosing all alternatives should include presenting
the option of not pursuing any further medical treatment. In some cases of terminal or incurable
illness, the clinical trial might represent the last option for a patient. Many cancer patients who
have shown resistance to standard forms of treatment view clinical trials as a means to gain
access to experimental drugs that offer a glimmer of hope for recovery.36 It is tempting to present
an experimental protocol as the only remaining viable choice to this vulnerable class of potential
subjects. Even when both the patient and the physician view the clinical trial as a last resort, the
informed consent process should not present enrollment as the only option.
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Coercion, even well-intentioned coercion, stands contradictory to the risk perception model of
voluntarism described above. Because individuals are more likely to engage in risks chosen
voluntarily, coercion is more likely to deter than attract participants.

A researcher should

accentuate that participation is voluntary and present all other available options including the
option of discontinuing medical treatment. By using the risk perception concept of voluntary
choice, the informed consent process can heighten both safety and participation.
•

“Most people are less afraid of a risk they feel they have some control
over”37

For example, many people would rather drive as opposed to riding as a passenger in a car
or airplane.38 The relationship between control and risk perception is a simple extension of the
previous discussion about choice. Exerting control over a risk means maintaining voluntary
choice.
The risk perception principle of control can positively affect participation in clinical
trials. Physicians must inform subjects that they may quit the clinical trial at any time.39 Thus,
the decision to participate is voluntary not just at enrollment, but throughout the duration of the
trial. This risk perception concept highlights the ideal model of an ongoing, communicative
relationship between physician and volunteer.

Confronting the Therapeutic Misconception
•

“Most people are less afraid of risks if the risk also confers some
benefits they want.”40

This risk perception principle is most predictive of how a potential volunteer perceives
the clinical trial risk. An analysis of the benefits of clinical trials reveals how the risk perception
principle of benefit plays out in the clinical trial setting. First, participation may convey a “direct
benefit, that is, benefit to subjects from receiving the intervention being studied.”41 In other
words, a direct benefit occurs when the experimental drug itself conveys a benefit to the subject.
Second, participation also conveys a “collateral benefit, benefit anticipated for all subjects by
virtue of being a subject in a study, rather than by virtue of receiving the intervention being
studied (such as the provision of free care of the assertion that patients get better treatment on
37
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study because of increased monitoring, state-of-the-art testing, etc.).”42 Lastly, participants may
associate clinical trials with the altruistic “benefit to society, to scientific knowledge or to future
patients, rather than to current subjects.”43 The risk perception principle indicates that when a
volunteer recognizes potential benefits of participation, the volunteer is more likely to enroll in
the clinical trial. Thus, the risk perception principle guides the physician to disclose all related
benefits associated with the clinical trial. Furthermore, the current legal standard requires the
physician to disclose benefits.44 Thus, risk perception and law seem well aligned in this instance.
Trouble arises, however, in early phase clinical trials when direct benefits remain unconfirmed.
Most subjects volunteer for clinical trials in pursuit of direct benefits, although collateral
benefits and benefits to society also play a role in encouraging participation.45

A 1999-2000

survey asked 1,050 volunteers why they participated in clinical trials. Although some were
primarily motivated by collateral or societal benefits, the majority of respondents participated to
obtain direct benefits:
Percent of respondents stating their top reason . . .
•

Find relief: 60%;

•

Advance science: 23%;

•

Earn extra money: 11%;

•

Receive better medical care: 6%46

This revelation becomes problematic for the informed consent process when volunteers
are motivated by perceived, but unsubstantiated, direct benefits. Direct benefits are not supported
by scientific data until the third and final stage of clinical trials. Recall that phase 1 clinical trials
only test for toxicity. Phase 2 trials are the first attempt to measure efficacy for human subjects.
It is not until phase 3 clinical trial that direct benefits find support in the form of phase 2 efficacy
studies.47 Thus, clinical trial protocols often lack immediate factual support for direct benefits.
Nevertheless, most subjects choose to enroll based on the distant hope that the experimental drug
will offer relief. Experts in risk communication use the term “therapeutic misconception” to
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describe this “unrealistic expectation of direct benefit to subjects.”48 Sometimes, the therapeutic
misconception is so powerful that it generates its own direct benefits:
Studies show that patients believe they will receive a therapeutic benefit
from research – even if they know they may receive only a placebo
treatment. And, strangely enough, they often do: one recent study
showed that 35 per cent of placebo patients improved, in trials involving
seriously ill subjects. Apparently, the sheer hope of recovery is often
enough to alleviate symptoms.49
Because the therapeutic misconception exists in the minds of so many potential
volunteers, understanding this false hope is a crucial part of understanding “where the public is
coming from.”50 The informed consent process should not only provide accurate representations
of the risks and benefits, but should also debunk the closely held misperceptions that guide many
volunteers.
One of the easiest ways to help eliminate misconception is to start with semantics. For
example, informed consent documents refer to gene transfer protocols as “gene therapy.” Using
the term “therapy” inappropriately implies that the experimental protocol is designed to treat, to
offer direct benefits.51 By consistently renaming the protocol “gene transfer research”, subjects
may begin to more fully understand the intention of the clinical trial. Beyond that, physicians
should also candidly confront the therapeutic misconception. Yet false hope may stubbornly
survive: “Even when they have been explicitly informed to the contrary, subjects still believe they
are getting the treatment that is best for them, not best for science.” 52
The risk perception principle of benefit suggests that the associated benefits of clinical
trials positively affect enrollment.

Although collateral and societal benefits motivate some

participants, most volunteers enroll to obtain direct benefits. Because most clinical trial protocols
cannot offer direct benefits, the physician must not only decline from offering such false
promises, she must also strive to undermine the therapeutic misconception that erroneously
entices many subjects.
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Financial Conflicts of Interest
•

“Most people are less afraid of risks that come from places, people,
corporations, or governments they trust, and more afraid if the risk
comes from a source they don’t trust.”53

The element of trust works both for and against the physician in his effort to effectively
communicate during the informed consent process. During the course of clinical trials, the
manufacturer will test the experimental new drug on subjects who suffer from the target disease.
These subjects often learn that they are candidates for a clinical study from their doctor. After
enrollment, the volunteer is both a patient and a subject. Similarly, the doctor becomes both a
physician and a researcher. In cases where the subject-researcher relationship grows from a
patient-physician relationship, the foundation of trust is already built; the trust between patient
and physician grows from a sustained professional relationship. This trust is especially strong
when the patient and physician have been working together for years specifically to treat the
target disease. When the physician’s role shifts from administering treatment to administering an
experiment, trust alleviates the patient’s fears about ethical misconduct. On the other hand, trust
deceives the patient into believing that the clinical trial is a form of treatment, thereby
exacerbating the therapeutic misconception.54
In addition to the conflict caused by the physician acting as both physician and
researcher, the more troubling conflict of interest results when the physician-researcher also has a
financial interest in the outcome of the clinical trial. Just as the volunteer holds unsubstantiated
hopes that the experimental drug will produce the intended results, a physician with a financial
interest in the experimental drug holds similar unsubstantiated hopes. And just as a subject’s
hope alone may boost health, it appears that the hope of profit is enough to boost data results too:
a “report in the Journal of the American Medical Association . . . found that nonprofit studies of
cancer drugs were eight times more likely to reach unfavorable conclusions than industrysponsored studies.”55
Despite the possible consequences of financial ties between research and medicine, this
symbiotic relationship makes sense. The physician invests her professional life in pursuit of
wellness - why not her financial interests as well? Physicians, like all other professionals, must
draw a line between being bought and being paid. Responsible disclosure and oversight, as
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opposed to absolute restriction and prohibition, should govern the financial interests of physicianresearchers.
Financial conflict of interest affects the informed consent process by affecting trust
between patient and physician. Trust, in turn, affects risk perception. The medical professional
must reach a balance between using trust and abusing trust. An appropriate relationship of trust
helps create the ideal model of partnership between physician and subject.

Conclusion
Risk perception creates a framework in which to address the current failure of informed
consent. The concepts of choice, control, benefit, and trust shed light on how a volunteer
perceives risk. By understanding how the volunteer perceives and reacts to risk, we can revise
the existing informed consent process to better achieve its objectives of protecting volunteers as
well as encouraging participation.
By: Dana Ziker

